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Abstract
Although traditional economic models posit that money is fungible, psychological research
abounds with examples that deviate from this assumption. Across eight experiments, we provide
evidence that people construe physical currency as carrying traces of its moral history. In Experi-
ments 1 and 2, people report being less likely to want money with negative moral history (i.e.,
stolen money). Experiments 3–5 provide evidence against an alternative account that people’s
judgments merely reflect beliefs about the consequences of accepting stolen money rather than
moral sensitivity. Experiment 6 examines whether an aversion to stolen money may reflect con-
tamination concerns, and Experiment 7 indicates that people report they would donate stolen
money, thereby counteracting its negative history with a positive act. Finally, Experiment 8
demonstrates that, even in their recall of actual events, people report a reduced tendency to accept
tainted money. Altogether, these findings suggest a robust tendency to evaluate money based on
its moral history, even though it is designed to participate in exchanges that effectively erase its
origins.
Keywords: Money; Morality; Social cognition; Disgust
1. Introduction
Economic models assume that money is fungible—any given piece (dollar, euro, yuan)
is an abstract unit of exchange that represents a monetary amount, and its history and
physicality are insignificant (Coulborn, 1950; Thaler, 1990). Thus, one dollar is the same
as any other, in the sense that they are literally interchangeable. Whether the dollar is a
coin or a bill, a birthday gift from your beloved grandmother or the ill-gotten gains from
a drug dealer, newly minted or plucked from the sewers, its value and function remain
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constant. Nonetheless, an extensive body of research indicates that people’s judgments
deviate from the strict notion of fungibility assumed by classical economic models. For
example, in a phenomenon known as “mental accounting,” people separately budget for
different expenses (e.g., gas, food) and separately track different sources of income (Hast-
ings & Shapiro, 2013). Thus, gift money, found money, earned money, and illegally
obtained money may be expended on different purchases (e.g., gift money is spent more
on frivolous goods; Hoigard & Finstad, 1992; Kardos & Castano, 2012; Levav &
McGraw, 2009; Stellar & Willer, 2014; Zelizer, 1994). These results indicate that the
meaning of money is importantly linked to its source.
The current studies examine another key way that source influences how people reason
about money by asking whether physical currency is treated as inheriting moral valence
from its past. For non-monetary goods, the moral qualities of an owner influence how
people think about objects and their value (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994, 2000; Rozin,
Nemeroff, Wane, & Sherrod, 1989). For example, people report that they would not wish
to wear clothing once worn by a disliked person (Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986).
Adults also report being willing to pay premium prices for items that have come in con-
tact with popular celebrities (Newman, Diesendruck, & Bloom, 2011), and even preschool
children believe that items that were owned by a beloved celebrity are more valuable
than items that were owned by an ordinary person (Gelman, Frazier, Noles, Manczak, &
Stilwell, 2015). Beyond the laboratory as well, the degree to which an object is thought
to have had physical contact with its owner influences how much people pay for it at
celebrity auctions (Newman & Bloom, 2014).
An open question is whether monetary tokens are likewise thought to be contaminated
by, and carry traces of, their moral history. Money is designed to participate in exchanges
that effectively erase its origins, and thus discomfort with “dirty money” may not trans-
late to concerns about the moral history of particular monetary tokens. Intriguingly, how-
ever, recent findings suggest that people do care about the physicality of monetary
tokens, although none of this work has focused on the transmission of moral history per
se. For example, people are more likely to spend worn bills than crisp bills, ridding them-
selves of money that is literally contaminated (Di Muro & Noseworthy, 2013; Galoni &
Noseworthy, 2015). Furthermore, people judge that ownership attaches to the physical
instantiation of money, such that lost or stolen bills should be returned to the owner in
their original form rather than replaced with an equivalent amount (Uhlmann & Zhu,
2013). These findings—that physical monetary tokens are the site of literal contamination
and ownership—demonstrate that money is construed not only in terms of its abstract
economic potential but also in terms of its physical substance and material history. Yet
concepts of literal contamination and ownership are themselves fundamentally tied to
object origins and history (Friedman, Neary, Defeyter, & Malcolm, 2011; Gelman, Man-
czak, & Noles, 2012), and thus it is unclear whether the physicality of money extends
beyond such concepts.
In virtually all societies, money can be considered as either “clean” or “dirty” based
on how it was acquired (Douglas, 1967), with implications for how it is spent, or even
whether it can be spent. Moreover, anthropological fieldwork suggests that at least in
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some communities, moral history affects physical currency itself (Belk & Wallendorf,
1990; Shipton, 1989). For example, among the Luo of Kenya, bad money—or bitter
money—obtains its status through theft and harm; such money is considered dangerous
and can only become good through an elaborate purification ritual. These provocative
findings suggest that money, like other physical objects, may be viewed as retaining
traces of its moral history. However, this idea has yet to be studied experimentally or in
other cultural contexts, especially a large-scale industrialized community in which money
is highly standardized and typically exchanged among strangers.
1.1. The current studies
The present studies examined people’s attitudes toward money that participated in
morally negative events, either directly (it was stolen) or indirectly (it was offered by a
thief). Specifically, we asked people how much they wanted to have money with varying
histories, described in five different types of scenarios. Two served as baseline measures
of how much people want money: neutral-giver/neutral-money, in which a character sim-
ply offered the participant money (designed to assess rates of desirability where there are
no barriers, thus providing a high baseline), and dirty-money, in which a character
sneezed on money and subsequently offered this money to the participant (designed to
assess rates of desirability when there is literal contamination, thus providing a low base-
line). The three remaining scenarios served as the key measures. Two involved stolen
money that was offered to the participant, either by the person who stole it (bad-giver/
bad-money) or by someone who found it (neutral-giver/bad-money). Finally, we included
a scenario in which a thief offered participants non-stolen money (bad-giver/neutral-
money).
These scenarios permitted us to differentiate between three different accounts of how
moral history might influence people’s economic judgments. (a) If people view moral his-
tory as contaminating the physical currency itself, they will be less likely to want the
money in the neutral-giver/bad-money and bad-giver/bad-money conditions than in the
bad-giver/neutral-money condition, where the physical currency itself was not involved in
a morally questionable event. (b) In contrast, people may attach moral blame exclusively
to the thief, with no consideration of the source of the physical currency per se. Under
this account, people should want the money in the bad-giver/neutral-money and bad-
giver/bad-money conditions at similar rates because, in both cases, the giver stole money.
(c) A third possibility is that people may avoid any exchange for which they have a nega-
tive association or possible moral contamination, thus wanting the money equally in the
bad-giver/neutral-money, neutral-giver/bad-money, and bad-giver/bad-money conditions.
Experiments 1 and 2 examine how much people would like to have money across all
five scenarios, and find that participants report they would less like to have money with a
negative moral history. Experiments 3–5 provide evidence against an alternative interpre-
tation of this result, namely, that people are simply concerned that they might get into
trouble for wanting stolen money. Experiment 6 examines whether people’s aversion to
stolen money may reflect concerns about moral contamination. Experiment 7 finds that
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people report they would be less likely to spend money with negative moral history on
themselves, and more likely to donate such money to charity, consistent with the notion
that they wish to counteract its negative history with a positive moral act. Finally, Experi-
ment 8 shows that, in their recall of actual events, people report that when offered money
that they considered morally compromised, they often rejected it. Altogether, these stud-
ies suggest a robust tendency to evaluate money based on its moral history, even though
it is designed to participate in exchanges that effectively erase its origins.
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
One hundred adults (34 females; Mage = 32 years; range = 18–69 years) completed the
study online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants in all studies were
located in the United States.
2.1.2. Materials and procedure
Each participant was presented with five scenarios presented in random order in which
a dollar was described, and they were asked how much they wanted the dollar, using a
7-point scale anchored by “not at all” (1) to “very much” (7). The five scenarios were as
follows: (a) neutral-giver/neutral-money (e.g., “Henry has a dollar in his desk. Henry says
you can have the dollar, if you want.”); (b) bad-giver/neutral-money (e.g., “Paul stole a
dollar from another person. The dollar that he stole is in his pocket. Paul has another dol-
lar that he did not steal, in his desk. Paul says you can have the dollar in his desk, if you
want.”); (c) neutral-giver/bad-money (e.g., “Frank found a stolen dollar in his desk. Frank
says you can have the dollar, if you want.”); (d) bad-giver/bad-money (e.g., “Brian stole
a dollar from another person. Brian says you can have the dollar, if you want.”); (e)
dirty-money (e.g., “Marvin sneezed and used a dollar to wipe his nose. Marvin says you
can have the dollar, if you want.”).
2.2. Results and discussion
A repeated-measures ANOVA on adults’ ratings with scenario as a within-subject factor
yielded a main effect of scenario, F(4, 396) = 80.09, p < .001, g2p = .45; see Fig. 1. A
series of planned comparisons examined three issues: (a) how moral history compared to
moral association; (b) the role of moral history when controlling for the giver’s moral sta-
tus; and (c) how the key conditions involving a moral misdeed compared to the two base-
line conditions.
To examine whether moral history matters more than moral association, we compared
responses in the neutral-giver/bad-money condition to the bad-giver/neutral-money condi-
tion. People reported that they were less likely to want a dollar with a negative moral
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history than a negative moral association, t(99) = 4.50, p < .001, d = .45, thus indicating
that moral history trumps moral association. As a test of whether moral history of the
particular dollar influences people’s judgments, we compared responses in the bad-giver/
bad-money condition to the bad-giver/neutral-money condition and found that people
were less likely to want the dollar involved in the theft than another dollar possessed by
the thief of a dollar, t(99) = 6.95, p < .001, d = .70. This result indicates that moral his-
tory specifically and selectively contaminates the physical currency that had participated
in the morally negative event.
The analyses next focused on how the key conditions above compared to the baselines.
As predicted, people were more likely to want the money in the neutral-giver/neutral-
money condition than they were in the dirty-money condition, t(99) = 17.51, p < .001,
d = 1.75, demonstrating that the task was sensitive to the baseline comparisons of neutral
versus literal contamination. They were also more likely to want the money in the neu-
tral-giver/neutral-money condition than in the three conditions involving a moral mis-
deed, ps < .001, and they were also less likely to want the money in the dirty-money
condition than in the bad-giver/neutral-money condition, t(99) = 6.93, p < .001, d = .69,
and the neutral-giver/bad-money condition, t(99) = 3.75, p < .001, d = .38. There was no
difference between the dirty-money and bad-giver/bad-money conditions, t(99) = 1.54,
p = .13, d = .15.
Taken together, these findings indicate that people show an aversion to money with
tainted moral history by placing more weight on moral history than moral association,
and additional weight on the physical bill that had participated in the stealing event.
These results support the interpretation that moral history is thought to cling to monetary
tokens.
Fig. 1. Experiment 1, participants’ mean ratings of how much they would want a dollar, on a scale of 1
(“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”), across five scenarios. Error bars represent SE.
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3. Experiment 2
Experiment 1 provides evidence that people attach moral significance to physical cur-
rency and are less likely to report wanting money with a moral taint. However, it is pos-
sible that people may only show this aversion for small amounts of money, on which
they place little value. A stronger test of the power of moral history would be to replicate
Experiment 1 with higher-value bills. Experiment 2 did so, using hundred-dollar bills
instead of dollar bills. We predicted that even when the monetary benefit was substan-
tially higher, participants would continue to report lower rates of wanting the stolen
money.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
One hundred adults (45 females; Mage = 37 years; range = 19–68 years) completed the
study online via MTurk.
3.1.2. Materials and procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that the scenarios involved a
one hundred-dollar bill instead of a dollar bill.
3.2. Results and discussion
A repeated-measures ANOVA on ratings with scenario as a within-subject factor yielded
a main effect of scenario, F(4, 396) = 83.67, p < .001, g2p = .46; see Fig. 2. As in Exper-
iment 1, moral history trumps moral association—people were less likely to want the
money in the neutral-giver/bad-money condition than in the bad-giver/neutral-money con-
dition, t(99) = 7.05, p < .001, d = .71. Moreover, people were less likely to want the
money in the bad-giver/bad-money condition than in the bad-giver/neutral-money condi-
tion, t(99) = 8.93, p < .001, d = .89. Participants were also more likely to want the
money in the neutral-giver/neutral-money compared to the other conditions, ps < .001,
but unlike in Experiment 1, they were more likely to want the money in the dirty-money
condition than in the three conditions involving a moral misdeed, ps < .01.
These findings provide evidence that an aversion toward tainted money is not restricted
to cases when the amount on offer is small (one dollar). Instead, it seems that people also
imbue larger amounts of money (one hundred dollars) with moral history. If anything,
these results suggest that the moral taint of money is substantially more powerful than
the non-moral taint of literally dirty money: Whereas the monetary amount influenced
people’s attitudes toward money that was dirty, it did not influence people’s attitudes
toward money that was tainted. Why such differences were obtained is open to at least
two interpretations. One possibility is that the degree of moral taint increases as the
amount stolen increases (i.e., it is more of a moral violation to steal $100 than $1),
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suggesting that the increased benefit to the participant is offset by the increased moral
taint. In contrast, the degree of literal dirt does not differ for a sneezed-upon $100 bill
versus a sneezed-upon $1 bill. Another possibility is that literal contamination is viewed
as more reversible than moral contamination, so that people reason they could clean a lit-
erally dirty hundred-dollar bill but not a stolen hundred-dollar bill. Support for the latter
interpretation is that some participants did mention ways of cleaning the dirty $100 bill
(e.g., “I can spray it with Lysol and wash my hands!”). Although a literally dirty one-dol-
lar bill could also be cleaned, participants may be less motivated to engage in that effort,
given the lower amount. In any case, regardless of why these differences across studies
were obtained, the present findings taken as a whole indicate that people imbue money
with moral history even when the amount on offer is large.
4. Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that people attach moral significance to physical currency
and are less likely to want tainted money because of this. However, a possible alternative
interpretation of this result is that people believe that they could get in trouble by accept-
ing a stolen bill. For example, paper bills are potentially traceable, as each carries a
unique serial number, and thus someone in possession of a stolen bill could theoretically
be caught and punished on that basis. To address this alternative, Experiment 3 tested
people’s economic judgments about quarters, which do not carry serial numbers like
paper bills. If people in Experiments 1 and 2 rejected the stolen money strictly out of
concern about getting into trouble, then such concern should be reduced when the money
Fig. 2. Experiment 2, participants’ mean ratings of how much they would want a $100 bill, on a scale of 1
(“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”), across five scenarios. Error bars represent SE.
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is in the form of non-traceable coins. In contrast, if people continue to show an aversion
toward quarters with a morally negative past, then this is further evidence for their con-
cern about the moral history of the money.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
One hundred adults (41 females; Mage = 36 years; range = 18–68 years) completed the
study online via MTurk. An additional 100 adults (36 females; Mage = 36 years;
range = 19–67 years) participated in a pretest, also via MTurk.
4.1.2. Materials and procedure
The procedure was the same as in the previous experiments, except that the scenarios
involved four quarters. Because the logic of the study rests on the assumption that people
believe quarters to be less traceable than dollars, we also conducted a pretest with a sepa-
rate group of participants, assessing their beliefs about the traceability of dollar bills and
quarters. Specifically, participants randomly received one of two questions about dollars
or quarters: “Please answer this question with regard to U.S. dollar bills (quarter coins)
that are currently in circulation. Do you think that a dollar bill (quarter) carries a unique
serial number that could be traced?” Participants indicated their response by choosing
“yes” or “no.” A Fisher’s exact test revealed that participants judged that dollars are
traceable (76%) more than quarters (16%), p < .001, and each judgment differed from
chance, ps < .001 by a binomial test.
4.2. Results and discussion
A repeated-measures ANOVA on ratings with scenario as a within-subject factor yielded
a main effect of scenario, F(4, 396) = 54.08, p < .001, g2p = .35; see Fig. 3. As in the
previous experiments, moral history trumps moral association—people were less likely to
want the money in the neutral-giver/bad-money condition than in the bad-giver/neutral-
money condition, t(99) = 5.62, p < .001, d = .56. Moreover, people were less likely to
want the quarters involved in the theft (bad-giver/bad-money) than the quarters possessed
by the thief of four other quarters (bad-giver/neutral-money), t(99) = 7.35, p < .001,
d = .74. Participants were also more likely to want the money in the neutral-giver/neu-
tral-money condition compared to the other conditions, ps < .001, and they were less
likely to want the money in the dirty-money condition than in the bad-giver/neutral-
money condition, t(99) = 4.41, p < .001, d = .44. The dirty-money condition did not dif-
fer from either the neutral-giver/bad-dollar condition, t(99) = .25, p = .80, d = .03, or
the bad-giver/bad-money condition, t(99) =1.34, p = .18, d = .13, perhaps because the
dirty-money condition was less extreme, as it did not involve the character wiping his
nose on the money.
Taken together, these findings show that people continue to show an aversion toward
morally tainted money even when the likelihood of getting into trouble is reduced. If
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people were simply concerned about getting caught for being in possession of stolen
money, then such concerns should be lessened in this context because quarters are not
uniquely traceable in the same way that dollars are. However, people showed the same
pattern of results with quarters as they did with dollar bills.
5. Experiment 4
Although the prior experiment indicated that people do not want quarters with a nega-
tive moral history—even though quarters (unlike dollar bills) are not traceable—people
may still fear the consequences of accepting stolen money (e.g., if someone saw the
money being stolen). Experiment 4 provides a stronger test by stipulating that no one
would ever know that the money was stolen. We reasoned that if only the thief was
aware of the crime, the possibility of getting into trouble would be greatly reduced. If
participants nonetheless continue to show an aversion to the stolen money, this would
provide additional support for the interpretation that people believe that moral history
clings to physical currency, thereby contaminating it.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
One hundred adults (35 females; Mage = 35 years; range = 20–75 years) completed the
study online via MTurk.
Fig. 3. Experiment 3, participants’ mean ratings of how much they would want four quarters, on a scale of 1
(“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”), across five scenarios. Error bars represent SE.
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5.1.2. Materials and procedure
The procedure was similar to Experiment 3, except that the three scenarios that
involved stealing explicitly stipulated that only the thief saw the money being stolen, and
no one other than the thief would ever be aware of the loss. Specifically, the theft scenar-
ios changed as follows: (a) bad-giver/neutral-money (e.g., “Paul stole four quarters from
a large jar of quarters. No one saw Paul steal the quarters, and only Paul will ever know
that the quarters are missing. The stolen quarters are in his pocket. Paul has another four
quarters that he did not steal, in his desk. Paul says you can have the four quarters in his
desk, if you want.”); (b) neutral-giver/bad-money (e.g., “Frank found four stolen quarters
in his desk. Someone named Greg had stolen the quarters from a large jar of quarters. No
one saw Greg steal the quarters, and only Greg will ever know that the quarters are miss-
ing. Frank says you can have the four quarters, if you want.”); (c) bad-giver/bad-money
(e.g., “Brian stole four quarters from a large jar of quarters. No one saw Brian steal the
quarters, and only Brian will ever know that the quarters are missing. The stolen quarters
are in his desk. Brian says you can have the four quarters, if you want.”).
5.2. Results and discussion
A repeated-measures ANOVA on ratings with scenario as a within-subject factor yielded
a main effect of scenario, F(4, 396) = 42.78, p < .001, g2p = .30; see Fig. 4. As in the
previous experiments, moral history trumps moral association—people were less likely to
want the money in the neutral-giver/bad-money condition than in the bad-giver/neutral-
money condition, t(99) = 3.29, p = .001, d = .33. People were also less likely to want
the quarters involved in the theft (bad-giver/bad-money) than the quarters possessed by
Fig. 4. Experiment 4, participants’ mean ratings of how much they would want four quarters, on a scale of 1
(“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”), across five scenarios. Error bars represent SE.
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the thief of four other quarters (bad-giver/neutral-money), t(99) = 5.75, p < .001,
d = .58. Participants were also more likely to want the money in the neutral-giver/neu-
tral-money condition compared to the other conditions, ps < .001, and they were less
likely to want the money in the dirty-money condition than in either the bad-giver/neu-
tral-money condition, t(99) = 5.12, p < .001, d = .51, or the neutral-giver/bad-money
condition, t(99) = 2.88, p = .005, d = .29. The dirty-money condition did not differ from
the bad-giver/bad-money condition, t(99) = 1.46, p = .15, d = .15. Altogether, these find-
ings provide further evidence against the possibility that people reject stolen money solely
because they fear punishment. People report not wanting stolen money, even when they
are told that no one saw it being stolen and the owner was not even aware of the theft.
These results provide additional support for the idea that people consider money with a
morally negative past as tainted.
6. Experiment 5
Although the previous study provided vignettes stipulating that no one would ever
know that the relevant money was stolen, participants may have made additional assump-
tions about the scenarios that could allow for someone getting into trouble if they were to
accept the stolen coins. For example, participants could speculate that the person who
stole the coins would know that the recipient was in possession of stolen money. To
bypass this possibility, Experiment 5 asked participants how much they would want the
money if there was no way they could get into trouble for accepting it. In this way, we
can test most directly the hypothesis that participants are averse to accepting stolen
money, not as a result of direct negative consequences of doing so, but rather because the
money is imbued with its moral history.
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Participants
One hundred adults (40 females; Mage = 38 years; range = 20–72 years) completed the
study online via MTurk.
6.1.2. Materials and procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1; however, here, participants were
asked the following question at the end of each scenario: “How much would you like to
have the dollar, if there was no way you could get into trouble for accepting it?”
6.2. Results and discussion
A repeated-measures ANOVA on ratings with scenario as a within-subject factor yielded
a main effect of scenario, F(4, 396) = 57.27, p < .001, g2p = .37; see Fig. 5. As in the
previous experiments, moral history mattered more than moral association—people were
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less likely to want the money in the neutral-giver/bad-money condition than in the bad-
giver/neutral-money condition, t(99) = 4.39, p < .001, d = .44. People were also less
likely to want the dollar involved in the theft (bad-giver/bad-money) than the dollar pos-
sessed by the thief of another dollar (bad-giver/neutral-money), t(99) = 6.83, p < .001,
d = .68. Participants were also more likely to want the money in the neutral-giver/neu-
tral-money condition compared to the other conditions, ps < .001, and they were less
likely to want the money in the dirty-money condition than in the bad-giver/neutral-
money condition, t(99) = 6.03, p < .001, d = .60. The dirty-money condition did not dif-
fer from either the neutral-giver/bad-dollar condition, t(99) = 1.92, p = .057, d = .19, or
the bad-giver/bad-money condition, t(99) = .38, p = .70, d = .04. In sum, these findings
provide evidence against the possibility that people are less likely to want money with a
morally negative past because they fear punishment. Instead, they support the claim that
moral history clings to physical currency, thus making money less desirable.
7. Experiment 6
The experiments reported thus far demonstrate that people tend to reject money that
participated in a morally negative event, whether or not the money is traceable, whether
or not the crime is known, and whether or not they could get into trouble for accepting
the money. We have interpreted this finding as indicating that people view tokens of
money as carrying traces of their moral history, such that physical currency is contami-
nated by its negative past and thus should be avoided. Experiment 6 tests the prediction
that people’s desire for stolen money would be negatively associated with their
Fig. 5. Experiment 5, participants’ mean ratings of how much they would want a dollar if they could not get
into trouble for accepting it, on a scale of 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”), across five scenarios. Error bars
represent SE.
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contamination sensitivity. This prediction follows from prior research documenting that
contamination sensitivity predicts severity of moral condemnation (Chapman & Anderson,
2014; Jones & Fitness, 2008; but see Landy & Goodwin, 2015), in other words, that lit-
eral disgust is conceptually linked to moral disgust.
7.1. Method
7.1.1. Participants
One hundred fifty adults (51 females; Mage = 35 years; range = 18–67 years) com-
pleted the study online via MTurk.
7.1.2. Materials and procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, with one exception: After responding
to the five scenarios, participants received items from the Disgust Scale-Revised (Haidt,
McCauley, & Rozin, 1994), specifically, a subset measuring contamination-based disgust
(Olatunji et al., 2007). Scores can range from 0 to 20, with higher scores corresponding
to higher levels of contamination-based disgust. We also included the two manipulation
check items featured in the Disgust Scale-Revised, which 139 participants passed; data
from 11 participants were excluded from the analyses for failing this check.
7.2. Results and discussion
A repeated-measures ANOVA on ratings with scenario as a within-subject factor yielded
a main effect of scenario, F(4, 552) = 112.11, p < .001, g2p = .45; see Fig. 6. As in the
Fig. 6. Experiment 6, participants’ mean ratings of how much they would want a dollar, on a scale of 1
(“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”), across five scenarios. Error bars represent SE.
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prior experiments, people were less likely to want money with a negative moral history
(neutral-giver/bad-money) than money with a negative moral association (bad-giver/neu-
tral-money), t(138) = 8.39, p < .001, d = .71. They were also less likely to want a dollar
stolen by a thief (bad-giver/bad-money) than a non-stolen dollar possessed by a thief
(bad-giver/neutral-money), t(138) = 9.41, p < .001, d = .80. Participants were also more
likely to want the money in the neutral-giver/neutral-money condition compared to the
other conditions, ps < .001, and they were less likely to want the money in the dirty-
money condition than in the three conditions involving a moral misdeed, ps < .02.
Next, we examined the correlations between contamination sensitivity and judgments
in the money task. As predicted, there was a relation between contamination sensitivity
and participants’ judgments in the dirty-dollar condition, r = .25, p = .004, indicating
that the more sensitive to contamination participants reported as being, the less likely
they were to want money that was literally dirty. Moreover, as predicted, there was no
relation between the two variables in the condition involving neither literal nor moral
contamination (neutral-giver/neutral-money), r = .04, p = .62. Counter to our predictions,
however, there was no relation between participants’ contamination sensitivity scores and
their responses on the three scenarios involving a moral misdeed: bad-giver/neutral-dol-
lar, r = .05, p = .53, neutral-giver/bad-dollar, r = .11, p = .19, and bad-giver-bad-
dollar, r = .08, p = .33.
Taken together, these findings do not support the idea that people’s desire for stolen
money is associated with their disgust sensitivity. Future research could explore the mod-
erating role of disgust on the effects reported here, but it is important to note that recent
work suggests that disgust sensitivity may play little to no role on moral judgments
(Landy & Goodwin, 2015).
8. Experiment 7
If money is evaluated based on its moral history, then an important question to con-
sider is how people choose to spend money that may or may not be tainted. Thus, in
Experiment 7, we asked participants how they would spend the dollar in each scenario:
on something they need (e.g., rent), on a special treat (e.g., restaurant), on a donation to
charity, or on a gift for someone else. We predicted that participants would be less will-
ing to spend the money on themselves—either on a necessity or a special treat—when it
was stolen, reflecting discomfort with accepting the stolen dollar. We also predicted that
people would be more willing to donate the money when it was stolen, as this provides a
mechanism for counteracting its negative moral status with a good deed. Indeed, previous
work suggests that moral taint can be neutralized by contact with a virtuous source (e.g.,
a sweater once worn by Hitler becomes less evil if handled by Mother Theresa; Nemeroff
& Rozin, 1994), and sociological research suggests that money obtained from child
wrongful death suits—or “blood money”—is often donated to virtuous causes, such as
charities and safety organizations (Zelizer, 1994). Finally, we did not have clear predic-
tions regarding how people would judge the possibility of spending the money on a gift
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for someone else. On the one hand, giving a gift is a nice thing to do and so again may
be seen as a mechanism for counteracting the negative moral status of stolen money. On
the other hand, giving a gift confers “credit” to the giver (in the form of social capital),
and people may feel that such benefit is unearned when the gift was purchased with
stolen money.
8.1. Method
8.1.1. Participants
One hundred adults (48 females; Mage = 38 years; range = 19–68 years) completed the
study online via MTurk.
8.1.2. Materials and procedure
Each participant was presented with the five scenarios used in Experiment 1, in ran-
dom order, and was asked to imagine how likely they are to spend the dollar in each of
the following ways: (a) “I would spend it on something I need (e.g., groceries, rent, util-
ity bill)”; (b) “I would spend it on a special treat for myself (e.g., music, movie, restau-
rant)”; (c) “I would spent it on a donation to charity”; (d) “I would spend it on a gift for
someone else.” The four options were randomly presented on each trial, and participants
were asked how likely they were to spend the dollar in each way on a 7-point scale
anchored by “not at all” (1) to “very likely” (7).
8.2. Results and discussion
A repeated-measures ANOVA with scenario and spending option as within-subject factors
yielded a main effect of scenario, F(4, 396) = 17.85, p < .001, g2p = .15, a main effect of
spending option, F(3, 297) = 37.11, p < .001, g2p = .27, and a scenario x spending option
interaction, F(12, 1188) = 11.54, p < .001, g2p = .10; see Table 1. Given the interaction,
results are reported separately by spending option.
Responses differed across scenarios for the necessity, F(4, 396) = 25.17, p < .001,
g2p = .20, and luxury spending options, F(4, 396) = 18.63, p < .001, g
2
p = .16. As pre-
dicted, people were more likely to spend the money on something they need (e.g.,
Table 1
Experiment 7, participants’ mean ratings of how much they would spend a dollar on a necessity, luxury, char-
ity, or gift, on a scale of 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”), across five scenarios
Scenario Necessity Luxury Charity Gift
Neutral-giver/neutral-dollar 5.84 (1.33) 4.30 (1.88) 2.92 (1.93) 3.27 (1.82)
Bad-giver/neutral-dollar 5.04 (2.06) 3.64 (2.05) 2.93 (2.01) 2.73 (1.78)
Neutral-giver/bad-dollar 4.46 (2.14) 3.15 (1.89) 3.48 (2.18) 2.84 (1.72)
Bad-giver/bad-dollar 4.14 (2.40) 2.91 (2.05) 3.41 (2.38) 2.55 (1.80)
Dirty-dollar 4.17 (2.42) 2.91 (2.03) 2.51 (1.94) 2.56 (1.83)
Note. SDs are in parentheses.
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groceries, rent, utility bill) in the neutral-giver/neutral-dollar condition than in the other
conditions, ps < .001. Importantly, people were also more likely to want to spend the
money on a necessity in the bad-giver/neutral-dollar condition than in either the neutral-
giver/bad-dollar condition, t(99) = 3.60, p < .001, d = .36, or in the bad-giver/bad-dol-
lar condition, t(99) = 4.73, p < .001, d = .47. There was also a difference between the
latter two conditions, t(99) = 2.25, p = .026, d = .23. Also as predicted, participants
were more likely to want to spend the money on a special treat for themselves (e.g.,
music, movie, restaurant) in the neutral-giver/neutral-dollar condition than in the other
conditions, ps < .001. Importantly, people were also more likely to want to spend the
money on a luxury in the bad-giver/neutral-dollar condition than in either the neutral-
giver/bad-dollar condition, t(99) = 2.96, p = .004, d = .30, or in the bad-giver/bad-dol-
lar condition, t(99) = 3.66, p < .001, d = .37. The latter two conditions did not differ,
t(99) = 1.79, p = .08, d = .18. These findings are consistent with the view that people
are less willing to spend money with negative moral history on themselves.
There was also a difference across scenarios for the charity spending option,
F(4, 396) = 7.07, p < .001, g2p = .07. Although people were not more willing to spend
the money on charity in the bad-giver/neutral-dollar condition than in the neutral-giver/
neutral-dollar condition, t(99) = .06, p = .96, they were more willing to do so in the two
scenarios involving tainted money (neutral-giver/bad-money and bad-giver/bad-money)
compared to the neutral-giver/neutral-dollar condition, ps < .04. Critically, people were
less likely to want to donate the dollar in the bad-giver/neutral-dollar condition than in
either the neutral-giver/bad-dollar condition, t(99) = 2.74, p = .007, d = .27, or in the
bad-giver/bad-dollar condition, t(99) = 2.00, p = .048, d = .20. The latter two conditions
did not differ, t(99) = .43, p = .67. These results provide converging evidence that moral
history is believed to contaminate money, such that people prefer to counteract the nega-
tive history of physical currency with a positive act.
Finally, responses also differed across scenarios for the gift spending option,
F(4, 396) = 5.58, p < .001, g2p = .05. People were more likely to spend the money on a
gift for someone else in the neutral-giver/neutral-dollar condition than in the other condi-
tions, ps < .02. However, the bad-giver/neutral-dollar condition did not differ from either
the neutral-giver/bad-dollar condition, t(99) = .71, p = .48, d = .07, or the bad-giver/
bad-dollar condition, t(99) = 1.20, p = .23, d = .12. There was a difference between the
latter two conditions, t(99) = 2.28, p = .025, d = .23. These results suggest that different
considerations may come into play when contemplating gift-giving, especially since the
provenance of a gift has strong meaning, as can be seen with prohibitions against re-gift-
ing (Ertimur, Mu~noz, & Hutton, 2015). When selecting a gift for someone else, the gift-
giver may avoid any purchase that could have a negative connotation. Further research
would be needed to test this idea.
Taken together, these findings indicate that people are less likely to spend morally
tainted money on themselves, yet they prefer to donate such money to charity. This find-
ing cannot be due to participants simply wanting to balance any bad deed with a good
one, as participants were less likely to donate the money in the bad-giver/neutral-money
condition than in the neutral-giver/bad-money condition.
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9. Experiment 8
An important open question is whether the tendency to imbue money with moral history
reflects people’s actual behaviors in the real world. Given the significant logistical chal-
lenges in testing this experimentally (e.g., convincing participants that a stranger who is
offering a stolen dollar does not have ulterior motives), we decided to test this in Experi-
ment 8 by asking people to recall prior relevant instances from their own experiences.
Specifically, participants were asked to recall instances in which they were offered money
that was “dirty,” either literally (e.g., sweaty or smelly) or metaphorically (e.g., stolen, or
obtained from a drug deal), and whether they accepted such money or not. We predicted
that participants would be less likely to have accepted metaphorically dirty money in the
past than physically dirty money, given the previous results indicating that the moral taint
of money is more powerful than the non-moral taint of literally dirty money.
9.1. Method
9.1.1. Participants
Three hundred adults (122 females; Mage = 33 years; range = 19–73 years) completed
the study online via MTurk. The sample size was selected based on piloting in which
approximately 15% of the sample reported being offered money with negative moral his-
tory. We selected 300 in order to have a sufficiently large sample for analyses.
9.1.2. Materials and procedure
Each participant was asked to respond to the following question: “Did someone ever offer
you money (coins or bills) that you felt was tainted or dirty, either literally or metaphori-
cally? If so, how was it tainted or dirty? Please provide as much detail as possible.” After
responding to this question, participants were asked to indicate whether they accepted this
money or not. Three independent coders blind to the study’s predictions coded each response
as belonging to one of the following four categories: physically dirty (e.g., “I have been
offered money out of a woman’s sweaty bra, I felt that it was literally dirty. The money was
wet.”), metaphorically dirty (e.g., “Many years ago my mother-in-law kept taking money
from a dying old man with no family and tried to give some to us.”), fake (e.g., “Someone
gave me a $5.00 bill but I noticed it was shorter than the other bills in my wallet.”), or none
(e.g., “Nobody has ever offered me money that I felt was tainted or dirty, either literally or
metaphorically.”). The three coders agreed on 92.67% of trials; disagreements were resolved
by a majority vote. The distribution of responses was as follows: physically dirty (n = 118,
39%), metaphorically dirty (n = 60, 20%), fake (n = 5, 2%), and none (n = 117, 39%).
9.2. Results and discussion
As predicted, participants accepted physically dirty and metaphorically dirty money at
different rates, Fisher’s exact test, p < .001. Although participants overwhelmingly
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accepted physically dirty money (103 of 118 participants, 87%), they accepted metaphori-
cally dirty money only about half the time (35 of 60 participants, 58%). These findings
are consistent with the idea that people show an aversion toward money with a morally
negative past, and that moral taint is viewed as more aversive than physical taint. At the
same time, it is important to note that metaphorically dirty money in this study included
not only stolen money, as in the previous studies, but also a broader array of contamina-
tion (e.g., money obtained from selling drugs or other illegal activities; money offered as
an emotional bribe; payment offered for volunteer work). Perhaps not surprisingly, in par-
ticipants’ retrospective reports, metaphorically dirty money was often offered by a person
who was morally comprised, so it is not always clear whether participants’ responses
resulted from an aversion to negative moral history, negative moral association, or both.
Nevertheless, it is notable that participants in this study rejected such money at similar
rates to participants in the previous studies, suggesting that even in recalling events from
their actual lives, people view money involved in questionable activities as morally
tainted and less desirable.
10. General discussion
Across eight studies, we have found that people treat money as carrying traces of its
moral history, whether the amount was big or small, likely to get them into trouble or
not, or offered to them actually or hypothetically. What could explain people’s attitudes
toward morally tainted money? On a purely associative account, negativity would have
affixed equally to all three conditions involving either a morally compromised giver or
stolen money, as all have a negative association, and thus people would have reported
not wanting the money equally in all three conditions. On a purely economic account,
blame would have been assigned to the thief without consideration of which particular
piece of currency was stolen, and thus people would have been less likely to want any
piece offered by the thief (bad-giver/neutral-money and bad-giver/bad-money), but not
the stolen money offered by a morally neutral individual (neutral-giver/bad-money).
Finally, on a physical moral taint account, contamination would have affixed to both the
thief and the stolen money, but particularly to the stolen money, because it participated
most directly in the morally negative event. Under this account, people would be less
likely to want stolen money from a morally neutral individual than non-stolen money
from a morally compromised individual. Our findings support the physical moral taint
account: People reported wanting the physical money that had participated in the stealing
event the least.
Given that moral history was viewed as contaminating, one question that arises is why
one form of moral contamination was considered worse than another. In other words,
why did participants treat money that itself was stolen as more noxious than non-stolen
money that a thief had handled, given that in both cases, the money had a morally nega-
tive history? Certainly, prior work demonstrates that even neutral items are viewed as
contaminated after contact with a bad person (Rozin et al., 1986). We suggest that the
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more closely the money is implicated in the moral misdeed, the more the money itself
becomes directly contaminated, and thus devalued. Consistent with this view, people were
less likely to want non-stolen money handled by a thief as compared to money without
that history, but the non-stolen money was one step removed from the key morally objec-
tionable event. We expect that similar effects would result in non-monetary judgments
(e.g., if a murderer used a belt to strangle someone, we predict that people would view
that belt as more negatively tainted than a belt that the murderer wore but did not use as
a weapon). Of course, how people evaluate money from wrongdoers will depend on many
things, including the nature of their misdeeds. For example, a dollar from a rapist may be
more noxious than a dollar from a thief. Moreover, the relative influence of moral history
and moral association could reverse, if the moral association is sufficiently troubling. For
example, participants may report wanting a neutral dollar offered by a murderer less than
a stolen dollar offered by a neutral person—or even a thief.
The current studies also argue against an alternative account, namely, that people did
not want stolen money because they feared punishment. First, in Experiment 3, partici-
pants showed a similar aversion to stolen quarters as they did to stolen bills, even
though quarters are not traceable like dollars. Second, in Experiment 4, we stipulated
that only the thief would ever know that the money was stolen, and yet participants
continued to show sensitivity to the moral history of money. Finally, in Experiment 5,
participants continued to show an aversion toward stolen money even when it was stipu-
lated that they could not get into trouble. Thus, the findings provide converging evi-
dence for avoidance of stolen money under a variety of circumstances, and no hint of a
lessening of the effect when the possibility of legal consequences is reduced. Neverthe-
less, it would be interesting in future research to further investigate whether the effects
reported here extend to cases where there are no legal violations whatsoever (e.g., the
so-called “blood money,” where one receives compensation as restitution for a family
member’s death).
Although we have focused primarily on the response patterns of each sample as a
whole, it is notable that we obtained variation in each of the experiments, with roughly
half the participants indicating that they would not want stolen money and roughly half
indicating some degree of wanting it.1 A critical goal for future work involves under-
standing what could account for these differences—that is, why some people are more
bothered by tainted money than others. For example, recent findings suggest that some
people are extreme non-cooperators, who maximize their self-interest (Yamagishi, Li,
Takagishi, Matsumoto, & Kiyonari, 2014), so perhaps participants in the current study
who most indicated that they wanted the stolen money were of this type. More generally,
it is important to note that the current studies were conducted within an industrialized
Western context in which money is a unit of exchange among anonymous individuals.
Future work should therefore investigate how other societies treat money based on its
moral history. Following research documenting substantial cross-cultural variation in eco-
nomic behavior (e.g., Blake et al., 2015; Henrich et al., 2005), much remains to be
learned about how and whether culture shapes people’s construal of money as morally
contaminated.
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Finally, it is important to examine whether beliefs about the moral taint of money
represent a foundational way of thinking. Future work should investigate this question
with children, who have less cultural knowledge and experience with money. Children
reliably show contamination sensitivity by 5 years of age (Hejmadi, Rozin, & Siegal,
2005; Legare, Wellman, & Gelman, 2009), and thus could potentially show effects of
moral contamination sensitivity with respect to money. At the same time, prior research
indicates important developmental changes in children’s economic behavior. Whereas
adults are willing to incur personal costs to ensure equality between themselves and an
anonymous stranger (e.g., an adult would rather share two dollars equally with a stran-
ger, such that each receives one dollar, than receive two dollars and leave nothing for
a stranger), this willingness does not seem to emerge until 7–8 years of age (e.g., Fehr,
Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Sheskin, Bloom, & Wynn, 2014). These findings, in
combination with recent work showing that young children behave more selfishly when
handling monetary compared to non-monetary goods (Gasiorowska, Chaplin, Zaleskie-
wicz, Wygrab, & Vohs, 2016), suggest that attention to moral history may develop in
tandem with children’s increase in moral concern. Understanding this issue becomes
important given our finding that moral history guides people’s behavior and understand-
ing of the material world.
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